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THE STATE AS A SECULAR PHENOMENON 
Erhard Mock* 
In all his works Julius Stone has always put stress on the im-
portance of historical reflection. Therefore, the author wishes to 
dedicate to Professor Stone this essay which deals from a Continen-
tal point of view with the historical background of one of the most 
fundamental principles of the modem state. This is the develop-
ment of the secular character of the state. The essence of this. pro-
cess (which predated the rise of the Continental democracies) is that 
the state as such is not to be identified with any religious or ideologi-
cal position, thus guaranteeing the plurality of society. 
Since Otto Brunner's notable work Land und Herrschaft was 
published, one has ceased to apply the word "state" to political 
societies of former historical periods. In other words, we have be-
come aware of the historicity of the phenomenon "state." We get a 
better understanding of the middle ages when we realize that these 
political communities were not states. This approach has lain bare 
the roots of the modern state. 
In the times of the vast European migrations, the Church 
seemed to be the only carrier of culture, civilization and education. 
Therefore, this period is rightly called the Christian period. Political 
and religious communities began to form a synthesis. These two 
types of communities were represented by the renewed empire, and 
the Roman Pope. In spite of the fact that Charlemagne's empire 
soon split up, Christendom remained the principium unitatis, that 
is, the only uniting bond of the Occident. The unity of Christendom 
was felt to be the unity of the Church. In the ninth century Hinc-
mar of Reims wrote that one should not speak about various king-
doms but only about one, which is the Church. 1 This conception 
of unity is theologically well based: some statements in the epistle 
to the Ephesians (e.g. about one god, one faith and one baptism; 
about some aspects of the teachings about Christ, mainly the 
dogma of Christ's corpus mysticum) and Augustine's idea about a 
Civitas dei became concepts with an immediate relevance to the 
political order.2 This idea arises clearly from a document of the 
times of Frederick II the Hohenstaufen: ecclesiam et imperium 
* Research Assistant, Salzburg University; Dr. Jur., University of Vienna. 
1. Mock, Intoleranz und Toleranz der Christianitas, INTERNATIONALE FESTSCHRIFT FOR 
ALFRED VERDROSS 371, 372 n . 6 (1971). 
2. Cf., Schmolz, Societas civilis sive Respublica sive Populus, 14 OsTERREICHISCHEN ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR 0FFENTLICHES RECHT 29 (1964) . 
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esse unum et idem et mutuis se debere vicissitudinibus adiuvare. 3 
The political and the religious community coincided nearly com-
pletely. The legal status in one of these communities conditioned 
the legal status in the other. Excommunication as the Church's 
legal sanction supported the empirical outlawry, and vice versa. 4 
In early Christendom it was self-evident that all law was 
founded in God. In many aphorisms and poems God and law are 
regarded as identical. One has to remember that the Landrecht of 
the Sachsenspiegel (1230) starts with the divine installment of the 
two powers, the Pope and the Emperor. We often find in chronicles 
the accusation that someone acted "against God and the law."5 This 
theonomically founded order was not only "Christian," in the sense 
that Christendom was regarded as the basis of the political order, 
but also in the sense that this order was sacred and immediately 
based on religion. It was regarded as a sacred order which included 
both spheres, the terrestrial as well as the transcendental, which did 
not yet differentiate between categories such as "spiritual" and 
"secular" or "church" and "state."6 The Christian Roman empire 
was not immediately based on a imperial Roman tradition, even 
though it seemed to all appearances derived from it. The empire as 
"ecclesia" was intended to signify the kingdom of God on earth. 
This bipolarity of Emperor and Pope in a religious-political 
order, where the Emperor as well as the Pope was the patron of 
Christendom and a sacred person, contained the seed of schism. It 
was the first achievement of the young science of theology to make 
a distinction between the spiritual and the secular, between 
"spiritualia" and "temporalid." This distinction became the main 
weapon in the so-called investiture-struggle. The representatives of 
the Church claimed the entire sacred sphere for themselves, as 
well as their legally constituted ecclesia. This latter separated it-
self, as a sacred-hierarchic institution based on canon law, from 
the previous all-embracing unity of Christendom. However, the 
claim for the liberty of the Church (libertas ecclesiae), meaning 
the Church's emanicipation from the secular sphere, meant the 
arrogation of the world's leadership. The Emperor, as well as the 
secular political power, was eliminated from the ecclesia. The Em-
3. Mock, supra note 1, at 372 n.8. 
4. 5 P. HlNSCHIUS, SYSTEM DES KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS 398 (1893). 
5. 0 . BRUNNER, LAND UND HERRSCHAFT 133 (5th ed. 1965). 
6. F. HEER, AUFGANG EUROPAS (1949), and literature there cited. 
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peror ceased to be a sacred person; he became a layman. As far as 
his duties as a Christian were concerned, he was under the eccle-
siastical jurisdiction. The Church, on the other hand, remained 
free from any secular responsibilities. This new order was clearly 
expressed in the so-called Dictatus Papae by Gregory VII. This 
development put an end to the sacral concept of the Emperor. The 
political order was removed from the realm of the sacred and holy. 
This was meant as a devaluation by the curial theoreticians, to re-
fute imperial claims in the realm of the ecclesia, but in the course 
of history this conception evolved into the autonomy of the politi-
cal and secular field. Thus even the scholastic philosophy (as an 
ecclesiastical movement) gave up the conception that law was pri-
marily based on God. This was done under the influence of the 
re-discovery of Aristotle's works. Law was now derived from the 
nature of creation understood as an autonomous order. In Thomas 
Aquinas's opinion, God acts by means of nature.7 God is no longer 
the immediate starting point of law as was taught in bygone times, 
but rather human nature is. In the same way, the political com-
munity is ontologically founded in man's nature, as man is con-
ceived as animal naturaliter politicum et sociale, as Aristotle had 
taught.8 From this relative autonomy of law, it was only a short 
way to the theory of Marsilius von Padua, a partisan of the German 
Emperor. Marsili us theorizes about theology only when he writes 
to remind theologians that their proper province is the beyond, 
and hie et nunc it is their duty to be good subjects to the Emperor. 
In his Def ensor Pac is, he tries to prove that no dispute is neces-
sary between the secular and the spiritual power, if only each re-
spects the competences of the other. However, the church is to 
exercise its task under the patronage of the political power. Marsi-
lius of Padua conceives, following Aristotle, the political communi-
ties (which he calls "regna" or "civitates") as democracies. It was 
Marsilius' conviction that an elected Emperor would be the best 
governor (genus electum principatus). In this context it is of great 
interest that the elected "princeps" is bound by statutory law. 
According to Marsilius, the primary and efficient cause for the law 
is the people or the totality of citizens or the major part of them 
chosen by their election or their will (expressed in a general as-
sembly), which under secular punishment orders that something 
7. AQUINAS, QuAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE POTENTIA DEi III, 7 ad 16. 
8. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, II, and 72a.4; AQUINAS, DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUNA Il. 
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has to happen in the realm of human behaviour, or that something 
is not to happen. 9 
Marsilius von Padua proves the anticipation of democratic and 
legitimate elements in connection with the secular autonomy of 
politics to be visionary. Compared with the severity with which the 
struggle of investiture was fought, the immediate historical and 
political results were relatively unimportant. The terminological 
differentiation between "spiritual" and "secular" was blurred by 
the fact that the new Christendom, now divided into "temporalia" 
and "spiritualia" continued the old traditions in the form of the 
sacral unity of church and state (for instance the act of coronation). 
In this connection the autonomy of the secular meant only that law 
and political community ceased to be part of the sacred and holy. 
They both were deprived of their immediate orientation towards 
eschatology and the Incarnation but their basic religious signifi-
cance was preserved. The release of the political community from a 
religious foundation took place only in consequence of the crisis 
which began with the Reformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. 
The understanding of religous belief as a quasi-legal relation of 
loyalty, plus the continued influence of the Christian idea of unity 
closed the way to toleration in the period of religious struggles. Thus 
it was unavoidable that the solution of this religious problem be-
came a matter of politics. In the Empire, it was mainly the differ-
ences between the Emperor and the estates and, in France, the 
Huguenot wars which brought about a purely secular community 
whose legitimation was based on secular principles, i.e. the state in 
the modern meaning of the term. The differentiation between spirit-
ual and secular, which first was made by the Popes (in order to 
justify the ecclesiastical supremacy) became the claim for the pri-
macy of national politics. No wonder the political power of kings 
and sovereigns, which did not see itself as secular, took care of 
spiritual matters, putting these under their custody in order to se-
cure law and order. In times of religious struggles a peaceful order 
and internal security could only be guaranteed through breaking 
free from the struggling religious parties. One has to keep in mind 
this necessity, if he wants to understand the principle "cuius regio, 
eius religio" (in the empire), the territorialism of the protestant 
ecclesiastical doctrine or as Hobbes's theory of state. 10 
9. Aile Zitate und Obersetzungen Nach der Ausgabe uon Richard Scholz, Marsilius uon 
Padua, Defensor Pacis I, 12 § 3 cited in 1 E. REIBSTEIN, VoLKSSOUVERANITAT UND 
FREIHEITSRECHE 34 n.20 (H. von Claudieter Schott ed. 1972). 
10. E. BOCKENFORDE, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Siikularisation, in 
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It is not necessary here to deal with the details of religious 
struggles. In this connection it is rather of interest to pay attention 
to the development of the special political thought which arose from 
the theories of the so-called "Politiques," (the French jurists) who 
understood the state as an entity and a concentration of power. In 
contrast to scholastic jusnaturalism, they based their ideas on a 
formal concept of peace, a concept which did not derive from the 
idea of a "life in truth" but from the contrast between peace and 
civil war. In consequence of the horrors and disasters of these strug-
gles, peace became an obviously justified value. In order to guaran-
tee peace, Bodin claimed the summa potestas for the king for the 
internal sphere of government as well as for the external field. It was 
again Bodin who posited religious unity as a value of second rank 
in his "Republic." Bodin said that in case of religious schisms the 
wisest sovereign should act in the same way as a good pilot who lets 
himself drift with the stormy sea, because he knows that his resist-
ance would cause a shipwreck. 11 Bodin undertakes to justify his 
opinion by giving a lot of examples from history. Thus he mentions 
the Emperor Theodosius I and his relations to the Arianists. He also 
quotes the Gothic kings Theoderich and Cassiodor and refers to the 
Orient, where different religions lived together, more or less in 
peace. 
In another work Bodin gives even clearer expression to the trend 
of the new times. Here I mean his work H eptaplomeres, where Bodin 
describes a discussion of seven wise men on religion. The conclusion 
of this work is the relative value of every religion, which leads to the 
relativism of ideas on justice. From then on there were no fixed 
concepts of justice, but as many ideas of justice as there were reli-
gious parties. In view of these difficulties-if not impossibilities-to 
determine what is just, the positive and written law had to gain in 
importance. The positive law, being the only guarantee of peace and 
order in these troubled times, therefore did not appear as unjust, 
but as inequitable and rigid. In any case it was the minor evil. The 
growing prestige of positive law, which was thought of primarily as 
statute law, gave rise to the concept of a mutual relation of protec-
tion and obedience (later systematized by Hobbes). The position of 
statute law moved into the center of constitutional theory. But 
SAKULARISATION UND UTOPIE 83 (1967), dedicated to Ernst Forsthotf on the occasion of his 65th 
birthday. 
11. A. BomN, LES Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE I, bk. 3, ch. 7; cf. 2 J. LECLER, 
GESCHICHTE DER RELIGIONS-FREIHEIT IM ZEITALTER DER REFORMATION 138 (1965). 
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while any derivation of law from material norm contained an ele-
ment of insecurity and was regarded as dangerous and legally irrele-
vant, positive law gained in value, and a sort of "formalism" began 
to prevail in legal thought until it reached its climax in Hobbes's 
Authoritas non veritas facit legem .12 In other words, justness of posi-
tive law depended solely on enactment by the competent author-
ity.13 
In the French Revolution, the type of state which had been 
envisaged during the religious civil wars was revived for a short 
time. In the Declaration of Human Rights in 1789, the state was 
conceived as a "Corps social." Its legitimation was neither thought 
of as deriving from historical tradition nor from a divine precept nor 
from the service of truth; the only legitimation was to be found with 
reference to the self-determined individual. Amongst the freedoms 
for whose preservation and safety the state exists, freedom of belief 
and religion were included in the French Constitution of 1791. Thus 
in regard to religion the state appears to be neutral. It freed itself 
completely from religious authority and moved religion into the 
sphere of society. 
The state's emancipation from religion is, however, to be distin-
guished from the so-called separation of church and state. In princi-
ple there are three ideal forms this separation might take. In the 
course of the revolutionary developments of the great French Revo-
lution the possibility of a laicism with anti-religious tendencies 
arose. The two other possibilities are either a moderate system of 
an established church or an amicable separation of the two spheres. 
When we regard this separation we are above all faced with the 
question of the significance of the secularization of the political 
community. This development is in fact an extended process of 
emancipation of the secular order from religious authority and 
connection. With the Declaration of Human Rights this process was 
completed. There the position of the individual is only determined 
by himself and his freedom. It becomes obvious that this concept 
of human rights granted by the state shows aporetic structures; for 
conscience-originally only valid in the religious sphere-can now 
be directed against the new state. Thus the modem state is based 
in the principle of freedom of conscience-a principle which may 
even act against the state. 
12. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, c. XXVI. 
13. Cf. R. SCHNUR, DIE FRANZ<'.ISISCHEN JURISTEN IM KONFESSIONELLEN BORGERKRIEG DES 16. 
JAHRHUNDERTS 69 (1962). 
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